On July 2, 2007, Robert Zoellick, a former U.S. trade representative and experienced diplomat, took over as head of the World Bank (World Bank, July 3, 2007). Zoellick was nominated for the post by President George W. Bush in May 2007 to replace the beleaguered Paul Wolfowitz, with whom Zoellick shares the dubious distinction of having supported the Project for the New American Century (PNAC) campaign to intervene in Iraq. In announcing the nomination, Bush called Zoellick a "committed internationalist" who is "deeply devoted to the mission" of the bank (Washington Post, May 30, 2007). In late June 2007, the bank's governing board unanimously approved Zoellick's nomination, saying in a statement: "In coming to their decision, the executive directors considered that Mr. Zoellick brings to the bank presidency strong leadership and managerial qualities as well as a proven track record in international affairs and the drive required to enhance the credibility and effectiveness of the bank" (Guardian, June 25, 2007).
Zoellick's last post in the Bush administration was as deputy secretary of state, a post he held until mid-June 2006. He then went on to be vice chairman of international operations at the investment firm Goldman Sachs, where he was also chairman of the bank's international advisers. Having previously served as U.S. trade representative during Bush's first term, Zoellick's 2005 appointment to serve as Condoleezza Rice's chief deputy was viewed by many as a sign that the administration would be taking a softer foreign policy line in Bush's second term. As the right-wing Washington Times reported (June 20, 2006): "Mr. Zoellick's selection by Miss Rice in early 2005 was seen as a victory for foreign-policy 'realists' in the administration against the hardline diplomacy favored by Vice President Dick Cheney and Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld, who were said to back State Department arms chief John R. Bolton" for the post.
Weeks before Zoellick made his mid-2006 resignation official, there was speculation that "Zoellick had at times felt marginalized at the State Department, where his subordinates, including R. Nicholas Burns, an under secretary of state, manage most of the major issues, including matters related to Iran, Iraq, the rest of the Middle East, and North Korea" (Washington Post, May 25, 2006).
Zoellick played leading roles in a number of high-profile administration decisions, including the effort to mediate the crisis in Sudan, where according to the Post he "was instrumental in pushing Darfur's rebel leaders to sign a peace accord." He was also credited with playing a constructive role in establishing a strategic dialogue with Beijing, which was highlighted in the press in January 2006 when Zoellick, then visiting the city of Chengdu, was photographed hugging a baby panda. Commenting on the incident, John Tkacik, a research fellow at the conservative Heritage Foundation, wrote that the "images of Zoellick clad in a sterile veterinary smock and gloves, cuddling a distinctly uncomfortable baby panda, could have been seen as evidence the Bush administration had gone a bit soft in the noggin on China. Indeed, the initial reaction among Washington China-skeptics was horror. We have since been reassured that Zoellick indeed has a special fondness for pandas derived from his service on a World Wildlife Fund advisory council, and that Mrs. Zoellick did indeed want such a photo. Zoellick also believed that his appearance with the panda would reassure the Chinese that he is still open to a 'global dialogue'—provided the Chinese start to act like they're interested" ("Revenge of the Panda," Heritage Foundation, February 26, 2006).
When he was the chief U.S. trade representative during Bush's first term, observers speculated on the significance of Zoellick's role in the administration. His record as a supporter of neoconservative outfits like PNAC prompted speculation that Zoellick would support hardliners in the Pentagon and the vice president's office. However, Zoellick was also viewed as a non-ideological member of the Republican Party foreign policy elite. Like his erstwhile boss Rice, Zoellick seemed intent on cautiously preserving U.S. supremacy, not projecting it unnecessarily.
Zoellick offered a succinct account of his views in an op-ed for the Washington Post shortly after the 9/11 attacks: "The terrorists deliberately chose the World Trade towers as their target. While their blow toppled the towers, it cannot and will not shake the foundation of world trade and freedom. Our response has to counter fear and panic, and counter it with free trade" (September 20, 2001).
In a 2003 speech at the Institute for International Economics, Zoellick similarly prioritized trade in his vision of U.S. foreign policy interests, arguing: "The United States seeks cooperation—or better—on foreign policy and security. Given that the United States has international interests beyond trade, why not try to urge people to support our overall policies? Negotiating a free trade agreement with the United States is not something one has a right to do—it's a privilege."
It was with a sigh of relief that many observers greeted Rice's decision in early 2005 to choose Zoellick over John Bolton as her number two at State. As commentator Jim Lobe reported: "Next to outgoing Secretary of State Colin Powell, Zoellick—a protegé of former Secretary of State James Baker—is the most internationalist-minded of Bush's Cabinet officials" (Tompaine.com, January 7, 2005).
Zoellick has a long track record in the economic policy and diplomatic affairs of Republican administrations since the late 1980s. During the second Reagan administration, Zoellick, a Harvard-educated lawyer, served as a special assistant at the Treasury Department. During the George H.W. Bush administration, Zoellick became a key figure in shaping post-Cold War economic policy as a senior officer in both the Treasury and State departments and as a personal adviser to the elder Bush.
In a January 2000 Foreign Affairs article, "Campaign 2000: A Republican Foreign Policy," Zoellick demonstrated a firm grasp of the radical new foreign policy directions that would come with a Bush Jr. administration. He faulted the Clinton administration for focusing too narrowly on economic policy and for promoting social and environmental causes within free trade organizations, as Bill Clinton did at the outset of the World Trade Organization (WTO) ministerial in Seattle. Zoellick spelled out a new foreign policy that would be based on the preeminence of military power—a concept of a new American century in which unquestioned U.S. military superiority would allow the United States to shape the international order.
Zoellick also used the article to spell out his vision of "evil" threats confronting the United States: "A modern Republican foreign policy recognizes that there is still evil in the world—people who hate America and the ideas for which it stands. Today, we face enemies who are hard at work to develop nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons, along with the missiles to deliver them. The United States must remain vigilant and have the strength to defeat its enemies. People driven by enmity or by a need to dominate will not respond to reason or goodwill. They will manipulate civilized rules for uncivilized ends."
Although regarded as a pragmatic promoter of U.S. economic interests, Zoellick has an idealist streak that aligns him with the neoconservatives. In his Foreign Affairs article, Zoellick points to the need for a foreign policy that recognizes that the "appeal of the country's ideas are unparalleled," and points favorably to the idealism of presidents Theodore Roosevelt and Woodrow Wilson in promoting their visions of an international order.
While Zoellick failed to seal a Free Trade of Americas Agreement during his tenure as U.S. trade representative, he won respect among the corporate community for his role in gaining bipartisan support for George W. Bush's request for "trade promotion authority," also known as fast-track authority because it reduces the role of congressional and public review of new free trade pacts.
When it comes to global economic policy, Zoellick is not a free trade ideologue or a committed advocate of the WTO. Instead, he regards free trade philosophy and free trade agreements as instruments of U.S. national interests. When the principles of free trade affect U.S. short-term interests or even the interests of political constituencies, Zoellick is more a mercantilist and unilateralist than free trader or multilateralist. This tendency was revealed during a 2002 speech Zoellick made at a German Marshall Fund meeting in Berlin: "I know Germans and Americans share values and experiences. Yet the question we must address now is whether we have shared interests as well. Many recent Euro-Atlantic squabbles ... reflect America's reassessment of its national interests in a changed world and Europe's conservatism in adjusting. Will there be a basis for a trans-Atlantic unity absent the intense cohesion of shared dangers?" (Montreal Gazette, August 10, 2002).
Zoellick coined the phrase "the coalition of the liberalizers" prior to the failed WTO ministerial in September 2003 in referring to the group of countries that have joined the United States in bilateral or regional trade pacts. In the face of mounting opposition from Brazil and other developing nations to the U.S. global economy agenda, trade rep Zoellick began forging a "coalition" of trade partners to agree to open their markets and protect U.S. investment in order to ensure coveted access to the huge U.S. market ("Coalition Forces Advance," IRC Americas Program Policy Brief, July 24, 2004).
In early 2003, Zoellick outlined a free trade strategy that anticipated rising opposition to Washington's liberalization agenda. Instead of committing itself to making the compromises necessary to completing another negotiating round in the WTO, the Bush administration announced that it would pursue its agenda through free trade agreements (FTAs) with single nations or subregional groupings. "Our FTA partners are the vanguard of a new global coalition of open markets," declared Zoellick.
At the beginning of the Bush administration, the United States had FTAs with only a few nations, including Canada, Israel, and Mexico. However, once Congress in 2002 gave the executive branch Trade Promotion Authority (the go-ahead to pursue fast-track trade negotiations) the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative launched free trade initiatives around the world outside of the WTO. Zoellick took the lead in negotiating the Central America Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA) in May 2004. That same month, he announced the start of bilateral trade negotiations with Colombia, Ecuador, and Peru (and possibly Bolivia) as part of the planned U.S.-Andean Trade Agreement, as well as the beginning of free trade negotiations with Panama (see "Coalition Forces Advance," IRC).
Zoellick termed his free trade strategy one of "competitive liberalization." By establishing numerous bilateral and regional agreements outside the WTO, the United States hoped to undermine opposition to its aggressive liberalizing agenda and to weaken developing country demands for U.S. market access, subsidy reduction, and special treatment in the WTO. In a July 10, 2003 op-ed in the Wall Street Journal, the trade czar articulated the U.S. global trade and investment strategy. Zoellick explained that under WTO consensus procedures, "one nation can block progress" in extending economic liberalization to new areas. Explaining that Washington can pursue its liberalization agenda outside the WTO, Zoellick warned: "It would be a grave mistake to permit any one country to veto America's drive for global free trade."
Although other nations remain committed to a multilateral forum and universal trade rules, Zoellick signaled that Washington was willing to proceed unilaterally. He predicted, "The WTO's influence will wane if it comes to embody a new 'dependency theory' of trade, blaming developed countries ..." Seeing the recalcitrance of many developing countries to approve new trade and investment rules, the Bush administration adopted a "my way or the highway" approach to global economy issues. This unilateral posture with respect to trade and investment rules mirrors its unilateralism in foreign and military policy.
When free trade talks broke down in Cancun in September 2003, Zoellick said that the "won't do" countries had won the day over the "can do" countries. Referring to the developing country coalitions that had come together to block the agenda of Washington and the EU, Zoellick issued a veiled threat to the multilateral process: "We're going to keep opening markets one way or another," he said.
The Bush administration's decision to raise agricultural subsidies by $80 billion in the 2002 farm bill underscored the charges that the United States is a free trade hypocrite. But protectionism and subsidies have political payoffs. When Zoellick returned from the failed Cancun talks, he was praised by leaders of the American Farm Bureau Federation for not budging on the issue of farm subsidies. This hypocrisy galls many developing countries, who see their competitively priced exports blocked by U.S. protectionism while at the same time heavily subsidized U.S. exports flow into their own domestic markets.
The Office of the U.S. Trade Representative relentlessly pressured other nations, particularly poorer ones, to liberalize their economies. For the Bush administration, however, free trade serves more as a battering ram to knock down national barriers to U.S. trade and investment than as a universal principle.
In a June 2001 speech to the right-wing Heritage Foundation in Washington, Zoellick made the case that there is no alternative to globalization and that U.S. companies and consumers were already benefiting in countless ways from this new wave of corporate-led economic integration. To drive his point home, Zoellick noted: "Even the funeral business has gone global, with a Houston-based company now selling funeral plots in 20 countries."
