Permalink | Date posted: July 01, 2011
With President Obama’s announcement that he would withdraw 10,000 U.S. troops from Afghanistan in 2011 and an additional 23,000 the following year, the president effectively ruptured the uneasy alliance his administration had maintained with prominent foreign policy hawks and neoconservatives ever since his progressive base began to question his escalation of the war. However much Obama’s conservative critics accused him of “dithering” in advance of his earlier decision to “surge” U.S. forces in the country, they were nonetheless among his more reliable backers when it came to the war in Afghanistan.
This alliance, however, is no more.
Only months after praising the president’s “sound policies” and christening him a “born-again neocon,” William Kristol declared last week that Obama’s Afghanistan policy was being “determined by [political advisor] David Axelrod, not by [Gen.] David Petraeus.” The main critique—which has been echoed by Max Boot, Peter Wehner, and many others—is that Obama “overruled” his generals’ preferences for a more limited or nominal pullout in order to score points with war-weary voters in advance of the 2012 election. Wehner accused the president of allowing “politics of the Obama kind to infect his decisions,” while Boot said that Obama had crippled the “well-thought-out campaign plan designed by Gen. David Petraeus” because “he wants the surge troops out before he must face the voters in 2012.”
Withdrawal, according to such neoconservatives, “ups the odds of defeat,” imperils “fragile gains” in the south end east of the country, and generally represents “a recipe for failure.” Worse still, they sometimes add, Obama refuses even to use the word “victory”!
Of course, while the wisdom of extended counterinsurgency is treated as self-evident within the neoconservative universe, it is less so on the outside. If war is ultimately a political undertaking, then it’s fair to allege that the political objectives of the Afghanistan surge are not being met. While NATO soldiers have had some successes dislocating insurgents from the south and east of the country, it is often only a matter of pushing them into Pakistan, where they wait until conditions change—as inevitably they must.
Meanwhile, the north of the country has seen a parallel increase in violence as militants trickle in from Uzbekistan and upward from the Pashtun provinces. The Afghan security and police forces have grown impressively over the years, but they remain largely non-Pashtun, indicating an ongoing failure to bring the country’s largest ethnic group into the political fold.
Violence against civilians—which has increased dramatically with the U.S. surge, even though most casualties are caused by the Taliban—continues to rise, and in fact set a monthly record in May of this year. Max Boot first used this fact to suggest that the Taliban was growing “desperate,” indicating the surge was working. Days later, after the attack on Kabul’s Intercontinental Hotel, Boot confessed that he was as “shocked as anyone” that militants had been able to execute the attack. Even as he insisted that security in the region remained “better than in Baghdad” (a dubious standard), he declared that the violence should preclude any more talk about withdrawing. Violence against civilians is thus set up both as evidence of the surge’s success and a stumbling block to its conclusion.
It’s true that military leaders have acknowledged their initial misgivings about the president’s plan. But unlike the neoconservatives, military leaders have also acknowledged that their role in a democratic system is to implement strategy, not to set it. By ascribing political motivations to Obama’s gradual withdrawal—indeed, even if they are correct—these hawks acknowledge, and dismiss, a popular desire to wind down the conflict. More subtly, the calls by Robert Kagan and William Kristol for Obama simply to “clarify” that withdrawal timetables remain anchored to “facts on the ground”—a seemingly low bar to meet for the heaps of criticism they’ve leveled at him—indicate their growing awareness of their own marginalization, which is also reflected in their obvious anxiety about the war-readiness of the Republican presidential field.
Moreover, by glazing over the fact that troop levels will remain double what they were when Obama took office even after the initial withdrawal, they overlook the argument that Obama’s remarks are as much about justifying continued investment in a conflict that he acknowledges must end. Indeed, the pace of the outlined withdrawal is gradual enough to cast doubt on any political gain the president may gain from, and Phyllis Bennis has lambasted the plan as embodying the same old “war-on-terror” mindset.
Max Boot is a neoconservative military historian based at the Council on Foreign Relations.
A foreign policy hawk known for his work shaping the 2007 Iraq “surge,” AEI fellow Frederick Kagan has authored numerous books and reports promoting long-term U.S. military intervention in the Middle East and Central Asia.
Robert Kagan is a leading neoconservative policy pundit, a cofounder of numerous militarist pressure groups, and an important backer of U.S. overseas military interventions like the Iraq War.
Weekly Standard editor and PNAC cofounder Bill Kristol is a longtime neoconservative activist and Washington political operative.
Michael O’Hanlon, a fellow at the Brookings Institution, is a well-known “liberal interventionist” who often teams up with rightwing hawks to advocate U.S. military action abroad.
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Douglas Ollivant, Countering the New Orthodoxy: Reinterpreting Counterinsurgency in Iraq, New America Foundation, June 28, 2011
In case any more hawks are looking to liken the Afghanistan surge to the one in Iraq, Douglas Ollivant details in a new report how the so-called Iraq “surge” had much less to do with the country’s progress than is generally assumed by the media.
Eric Margolis, A Real Pullout or a Shell Game? EricMargolis.com, June 25, 2011
Margolis argues that talk of military gains in Afghanistan obscure the larger political failures – while all the while the U.S. economy suffers from military spending-driven neglect. The United States “may linger” in Afghanistan, “but it cannot win.”
Robert Parry, Why Afghanistan Won't Become Another Vietnam, Consortium News, June 23, 2011
Robert Parry, who reported on Iran-Contra in the 1980s, argues that while progressives are likely to be displeased by the pace of Obama’s drawdown, it is in fact their activism (and not to mention the war’s failure) that has helped turn the president toward winding down the conflict.
H. Patricia Hynes, Reflections on Troop Withdrawal in Afghanistan, Common Dreams, June 23, 2011
“Are troop withdrawals sincere political acts with the goal of ending war?” Hynes wonders. “Or are they token gestures to a restless Congress and disapproving public?”
Phyllis Bennis, In Afghanistan Speech, Obama Offers Token Troop Withdrawals While Maintaining the "War on Terror" Mindset, AlterNet, June 22, 2011
Bennis argues that no matter how long U.S. troops stay, any “gains” they make will be offset by the inevitable requirement to leave – and they aren’t leaving quickly enough. She criticizes the war for its aimlessness and violence and quotes an Afghan proverb: “when two bulls fight, it is the shrubs and plants that suffer.”
John Nichols, Obama's Too-Slow Afghan 'Exit' Strategy Scores Him No Political Points,The Nation, June 22, 2011
Contrary to the view of neoconservatives who see Obama’s withdrawal strategy as calculated for political gain, Nichols argues that Obama’s timetable falls way behind that of the general public.
Reps. James P. McGovern and Walter B. Jones, The solution in Afghanistan: Get out, The Washington Post, Feb. 18, 2011
Two congressmen, one Democrat and one Republican, lay out one of the most forceful public cases for withdrawal yet to emerge from official Washington. “Simply put,” they write, “we believe the human and financial costs of the war are unacceptable and unsustainable.”
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Eric Edelman, undersecretary for defense in the George W. Bush administration and a board member of the neoconservative Foreign Policy Initiative, has long been associated with hawkish factions in U.S. politics, advising the likes of Dick Cheney, Donald Rumsfeld, and Mitt Romney. Edelman has advocated a militaristic response to Russia’s actions in Ukraine, calling on NATO to become directly involved in Ukraine and to reconsider its policy of not placing nuclear weapons in member states that were formerly part of the Soviet Union. Many international relations experts argue that such a move would likely provoke Russia into additional aggressive actions.
Otto Reich is a former U.S. diplomat who is best known for his participation in a domestic propaganda operation during the Iran-Contra affair. Since leaving government in 2004, Reich has continued to promote rightwing U.S. policies in Latin American while working as a beltway lobbyist representing Latin American governments and business interests. The Guatemalan government recently awarded a contract to Reich’s firm to “improve the perception, reputation, and the understanding of the reality of Guatemala.” Guatemalan President Otto Perez Molina appears to have been motivated to hire a lobbyist to counter criticism that was spurred after the arrival in the U.S. of tens of thousands of undocumented migrant children from Central America. Molina attempted to deflect the criticism by blaming the drug war and U.S. Cold War-era policies. “Given Pérez Molina's sharp criticism of the United States' history in the region,” commented one writer, “his choice—former Reagan official and noted Cold War propagandist Otto Reich—was a shocker.”
Unlike his more ideological peers, former CNN political analyst Bill Schneider seldom engages in straightforward issue advocacy, preferring instead to discuss policy issues in terms of their implications for electoral politics or Beltway political discourse. However, Schneider—a former fellow at the American Enterprise Institute and the Hoover Institution—occasionally betrays interventionist leanings on foreign policy, declaring in a recent op-ed that “if the U.S. doesn't do anything, nothing happens. … As in Kuwait, Kosovo and Libya, if the U.S. doesn't do something [in Syria], nothing will happen. The murderous bloodletting will go on.”
The Foreign Policy Initiative (FPI), a leading neoconservative think tank, claims to have a solution to the ongoing fallout from the 2003 U.S.-led invasion of Iraq: send more troops, bomb more targets, and get involved in Syria as well. Along with peddling an aggressive expansion of NATO along Russia’s borders and expounding on the virtues of nuclear weapons, FPI’s recent publications have urged the U.S. to send troops to Iraq and potentially Syria, launch an aggressive campaign of airstrikes against ISIS, and funnel arms to the Iraqi army (which previously handed over its weapons to ISIS), Sunni rebels in Syria (who could do the same), and Kurdish fighters in Iraq.
Retired Gen. Jack Keane is a frequent guest on Fox News and a contributor to the Wall Street Journal, where he is a reliable advocate for hawkish, aggressive U.S. foreign policies. Keane has been a vocal supporter of U.S. strikes in both Iraq and Syria on ISIS. However, left unmentioned in Keane's media appearances are his extensive ties to military contractors that might benefit from a protracted conflict in the Middle East—including Academi, the latest incarnation of the notorious Blackwater, which in 2012 hired Keane as a “strategic adviser.”