As the nuclear talks with Iran enter the final stretch, and as the media coverage reaches the point of hysteria, it is useful to step back a bit and offer a few observations about how to approach the kinds of revelations and arguments that we might expect in the coming days or weeks.
Here are five things to watch out for.
First, pay attention to definitions. People in a hurry–or people with an agenda–tend to speak in shorthand. If you don’t pay attention, that can be misleading.
For example, what is “breakout?” Put simply, for purposes of this agreement, “breakout” exists when Iran masses enough highly enriched uranium (HEU) needed for one nuclear device. Note that “breakout” does not mean Iran will have a nuclear device. It is the starting point to build a nuclear device, which most experts agree would require roughly a year for Iran to do–and probably another two or more years to create a device that could be fit into a workable missile warhead. Plus every other country that has ever built a nuclear weapon considered it essential to run a test before actually using their design. There goes bomb No. 1.
So when officials, pundits, and interested parties talk about a one-year breakout time for Iran, what they are really saying is that if Iran decides to break its word and go for a bomb, it will take approximately one year to accumulate 27 kilograms of HEU. The hard part follows.
Second, beware false prophets. There are a lot of people who have an interest in creating a panic about Iran’s nuclear capabilities. So be sure to take a look at their track records.
Some have been telling us for years that Iran is on the brink of having a nuclear weapon. The all-time winner in this category is Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. He first warned officially that Iran was 3-5 years away from a nuclear weapon when he was a member of the Knesset in 1992. Yes, that was 23 years ago, when Iran was emerging from the devastation of an eight-year war with Iraq and had not one single centrifuge operating.
He repeated this warning almost every year since, culminating in a speech to the United Nations in September 2013 where he displayed a cartoon bomb that was filling with 20 percent enriched uranium (weapons-grade is 90 percent enriched). When he spoke to Congress on the same subject recently, he did not mention the bomb, presumably because it had subsequently been drained of its fuel as a result of the interim nuclear agreement negotiated by the Obama administration in November 2013. But if anything, his warning of an imminent Iranian bomb aimed at Israel was no less dramatic.
We also have recently had a spate of calls to bomb Iran, specifically by Joshua Muravchik in The Washington Post and John Bolton in The New York Times. Both of these gentlemen were in the front ranks of those encouraging the invasion of Iraq, and both have well-established records of proposing a military attack on Iran as their preferred approach.
Bolton in the summer of 2008 proclaimed without qualification that Israel would attack Iran before the George W. Bush administration left office. That was at a moment when the Bush White House, to its credit, was internally floating the idea of a diplomatic opening to Iran and was putting in place a system to produce a young crop of American Foreign Service Officers who would be qualified to man a U.S. consulate or embassy if one ever came into existence.
Sen. John McCain (R-AZ), when running for president, got a lot of attention with his call to “bomb bomb bomb, bomb bomb Iran.” That didn’t work. Just last week, on the floor of the Senate, he encouraged Israel to “go rogue” and attack Iran.
The moral here: take the trouble to learn something about the track records of people who are preaching panic.
Third, pay attention to history. Those who offer a bland, one-size-fits-all version of history are almost always wrong.
For example, a few days ago the noted historian John Boehner (R-OH) commented about the negotiations that “Iran has no intention of keeping its word.” Others claim that Iran has always cheated on every agreement they have signed.
Actually, this is a subject I know something about. In January 1981 when I worked on the Iran desk at the White House, the United States and Iran signed the so-called Algiers Accords that ended the hostage crisis. There was an absolute deadline–Ronald Reagan was about to be inaugurated–and both sides had to make concessions at the last minute.
I won’t go into the details except to note that candidate Reagan denounced the agreement as negotiated under coercion and did not need to be observed by a new administration. However, when President Reagan and his advisers examined the small print, they realized that the Iranians had made extraordinary concessions that were important to U.S. interests. He quietly changed his mind, and five presidents have enforced the agreements. It has been meticulously observed by Iran, even at great cost. And by the way, the agreement was never sent to Congress for approval.
Fourth, when faced with the inevitable harsh criticism of whatever agreement may emerge, just think to yourself – is it worse than 2013?
That was the year when the Iranians were adding new centrifuges every day, when they were producing a growing stockpile of 20 percent enriched uranium, when the hardliners in Iran had nearly full control, and when there was talk of a military strike on Iran and a new Middle East war.
That threat should not and will not justify a bad deal. But at the same time, judging the agreement in terms of a perfect deal–what I call a unicorn deal because it does not and will not exist–is equally false and misleading.
Finally, do not believe in miracles. A nuclear agreement with Iran will not solve all the problems in the Middle East.
The Syrian catastrophe will not suddenly end. The Islamic State will not vanish. Sunni-Shia distrust will not be overcome. The political fallout of the Arab awakening will still be with us. Iran’s human rights record will not suddenly turn benign, and their hardliners will predictably continue to make distasteful statements.
But it is fair to ask yourself whether any or all of those problems will be made worse by such an agreement. One can argue about specifics, but in general we are likely to be better off after an agreement than we are now.