|
Institutional
Affiliations
Southwest
Missouri State University
National
Institute for Public Policy: Director
Hudson
Institute: Former researcher (2)
Comparative
Strategy: Editor (1)
Georgetown
University: Adjunct professor (1)
Government
Service
Department
of State: Defense Trade Advisory Group Member (1)
Strategic
Command's Senior Advisory Group: Member (1)
Deputy
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Forces and Policy (until
June 2003) (3)
Deterrence
Concepts Advisory Panel: Chair, 2001-2002 (2)
Rumsfeld
Missile Commission: Member, 1998 (1)
White
House Office of Science and Technology Policy: Consultant (1)
Arms
Control and Disarmament Agency: Consultant (1)
Corporate
Connections/Business Interests
NB:
Although NIPP has not released any information about corporate donations,
according to its web site, “The National Institute research
and educational program is supported by government, corporate, and
private foundation grants and contracts.” NIPP’s board
of directors is chock full of industry representatives, including:
Charles
Kupperman, a Boeing vice president; Henry
Cooper, the head of the pro-missile defense group High Frontier
and chairman of Applied Research Associates, a Pentagon contractor
that specializes in homeland security technology; William R. Graham,
a science adviser in the Bush Sr. and Reagan administrations who
has worked for various research-and-development outfits, including
the missile defense contractor Jaycor; and Henry
D. Train II, a retired Navy admiral and senior vice president
of Science Applications International, which according to United
for a Fair Economy received more than $5 billion in Pentagon contracts
during the 2000-2002 period.
|
Highlights
& Quotes
Keith
Payne, a longtime advocate of Strangelovian nuclear war-fighting
strategies and missile defense, founded his National Institute for
Public Policy in the early 1980s. In 2002, Payne was tapped to serve
as assistant secretary of defense for forces and policy, a position
he left in June 2003. His appointment followed the release of an
influential NIPP study called “Rationale and Requirements
for U.S. Nuclear Forces and Arms Control,” which served as
a model for George W. Bush’s controversial Nuclear Posture
Review (NPR). (2) Following the suggestions of the study, the NPR
called for expanding the number nuclear targets and the development
of “usable,” low-yield nuclear weapons. Soon after the
study was released, and before he was tapped for the Pentagon post,
Payne was appointed chairman of the Deterrence
Concepts Advisory Panel, a specialized Pentagon panel that was
charged with implementing the policies outlined in the NPR.
Payne
was not the only person who used the study, which was funded by
the conservative Smith Richardson Foundation, as a springboard into
the Bush administration. (4) Three other participants served alongside
Payne in the Deterrence Concepts Advisory Panel: Kurt Guthe, an
arms control expert at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments
who also worked with Payne on the 1998 Rumsfeld Commission to assess
the ballistic missile threat; James
Woolsey, the former CIA director, vice president of government
contractor Booz Allen Hamilton and current member of the Pentagon’s
Defense Policy Board; and Linton
Brooks, an arms control expert who helped negotiate the START
treaty with the Soviet Union and currently serves as undersecretary
of energy for nuclear security. Other study participants included
Stephen
Cambone, a former analyst for the missile defense contractor
SRS Technologies who was chosen by Defense
Secretary Rumsfeld to the be the first ever undersecretary of
defense for intelligence and who also served on both the 1998 Rumsfeld
Commission on the ballistic missile threat and the 2000 Rumsfeld
Commission on space defense issues; and Stephen
Hadley, Condoleezza
Rice’s deputy national security adviser.
One
of Payne’s claims to fame is a 1980 Foreign Affairs article
he penned with Colin Gray, also a NIPP researcher. The article,
titled “Victory is Possible,” argued that the “United
States must possess the ability to wage nuclear war rationally”
and must develop “a plausible theory of how to win a war or
at least insure an acceptable end to a war.” They also wrote:
“The West needs to devise ways in which it can employ strategic
nuclear forces coercively, while minimizing the potentially paralyzing
impact of self-deterrence.” They urged the United States “to
plan seriously for the actual conduct of nuclear war” and
to develop a plan “to defeat the Soviet Union and do so at
a cost that would not prohibit U.S. recovery.”
A
proponent of national missile defense, Payne has testified before
Congress on numerous occasions regarding missile threats and treaty
issues. In 1997, he testified on ways to accommodate the ABM [antiballistic
missile] Treaty to allow for a limited NMD system. However, he went
on to say: “It is important to note that my preference ...
is that the United States and Russia move away from a strategic
deterrence relationship based ultimately on mutual nuclear threats,
i.e., ‘mutual assured destruction,’ or MAD. We [his
coauthors on an AMB accommodation study] are not satisfied with
our outline for mutual accommodation that essentially revises MAD
only to allow for limited NMD protection against rogue missiles.
... We are reduced to the hope that the mutual accommodation we
outline can serve as a step toward the political relationship that
ultimately will allow us to abandon MAD.”
Soon
after becoming president, George W. Bush followed Payne’s
advice and abandoned the ABM Treaty, despite the protestations of
a chorus of former government officials and arms control experts
who argued that the treaty served as a cornerstone to the country’s
nonproliferation efforts.
|
