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Institutional
Affiliations
Center for
Security Policy: Member of the National Security Advisory Council
(9)
Project
for the New American Century: Signed the Jan. 23, 2003 letter
on defense spending and participated on PNAC's "Rebuilding America's
Defenses" report (7)
Lexington
Institute: Scholar
Center
for Strategic and International Studies:
Deputy Director of the International Security Program and Deputy
Director of Political-Military Studies (6), (8)
U.S.
Institute of Peace:
Study Team Leader, 1990-1991 (1)
Government
Service
2001
Department of Defense Transition Team: Member (1), (5)
Department
of Defense: Director of the Office of Strategic Competitiveness
in the Office of the Secretary of Defense (1), (5), (9)
U.S.
Arms Control and Disarmament Agency: Member (4)
Office
of the Secretary of Defense: Member (4)
Department
of State: Consultant (1), (5)
Department
of Defense: Consultant (1), (5)
Department
of Energy: Consultant (1), (5)
Corporate
Connections/Business Interests
Center
for Naval Analyses: Senior Analyst on National Security
and Defense Issues (1)
Science
Applications International Corp.: Senior
Analyst (1), (4)
SRS
Technologies: Senior Analyst (1)
R&D
Associates:
Senior Analyst (1)
System
Planning Corp.: Senior
Analyst (3)
Education
Pomona
College: B.A.
in Government and History (1), (4)
Johns Hopkins University:
M.A. and Ph.D. in International Relations and Russian Studies |
Highlights
& Quotes
Gouré,
an advisory board member of the hawkish Center for Security Policy
and supporter of the Project for the New American Century, is a
national security scholar based at the Lexington Institute, a conservative
research institute focusing on foreign, energy, and economic policies.
According to Lexington’s mission statement, “By promoting
America's ability to project power around the globe we not only
defend the homeland of democracy, but also sustain the international
stability in which other free-market democracies can thrive. The
Lexington Institute believes in limiting the role of the federal
government to those functions explicitly stated or implicitly defined
by the Constitution. The institute therefore actively opposes the
unnecessary intrusion of the federal government into the commerce
and culture of the nation, and strives to find nongovernmental,
market-based solutions to public-policy challenges. We believe a
dynamic private sector is the greatest engine for social progress
and economic prosperity.” (1)
In the December
2002 issue of Policy Review, published by the Hoover Institution,
Gouré wrote: “In preparing to confront these and other
twenty-first century threats, the United States will need a full
range of military capabilities, including strategic nuclear forces.
Although the size of the nuclear arsenal continues to decline, nuclear
weapons may actually become more important to American security.
Some potential adversaries are unlikely to be deterred by the threat
of conventional retaliation alone. They and others may seek to acquire
weapons of mass destruction in order to counter U.S. conventional
superiority. While strategic defenses and non-nuclear strike capabilities
can contribute to deterrence and broaden the range of options available
to U.S. leaders in defeating WMD-armed adversaries, these capabilities
cannot fully substitute for credible strategic nuclear forces. The
United States must have a strategic nuclear force posture that is
large (relative to the size of the anticipated arsenals of other
states), responsive, flexible, and credible. To that end, the United
States needs to maintain the existing triad of strategic bombers,
ICBMs, and SLBMs. Each leg of the triad provides unique attributes
that support overall force utility. Stratcom must have the intelligence
and adaptive planning capabilities to permit the development of
a wide range of employment options, including for the highly selective
use of new types of nuclear weapons. Finally, the nuclear infrastructure
must be sufficient to ensure not only the safety and surety of remaining
nuclear weapons but to assure the long-term viability of U.S. strategic
nuclear forces.” (2)
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